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Jurisdiction of U.S. courts to hear claims regarding detention in Iraq—reach of habeas corpus—
exclusive sovereign jurisdiction over crimes within territory—assessing concerns of torture 
MUNAF V. GEREN, 128 S.Ct. 2207. 
United States Supreme Court, June 12, 2008. 
In Munaf v. Geren,1 a unanimous Supreme Court held that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction under the habeas corpus statute to hear claims brought by American citizens held 
overseas by American forces “operating subject to an American chain of command, even when 
those forces are acting as a part of multilateral coalition.”2  In a defeat for the petitioners, 
however, the Court held that where petitioners are being held in another sovereign’s territory for 
crimes allegedly committed in that territory, federal courts should not interfere by enjoining their 
transfer to that sovereign.  The Court further held that concerns of torture after transfer did not 
change the result and that such concerns are best assessed and handled by the political branches.  
 Munaf decided two consolidated cases, Munaf v. Geren and Geren v. Omar,3 involving 
American citizens who had traveled to Iraq and been detained there by American forces.  Shawqi 
Omar, an American citizen born in Kuwait, traveled to Iraq in 2002.  In October 2004, American 
forces, operating under United Nations mandate as part of Mulitinational Forces—Iraq (MNF—
I) raided Omar’s Baghdad home and took Omar into custody.  Based on evidence collected as a 
                                                 
1 128 S.Ct. 2207 (2008). 
2 Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2213. 
3 See Munaf v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd sub nom. Munaf v. Geren, 482 
F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd 479 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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result of the raid, it was determined that Omar posed a threat to Iraqi security.4   
Omar’s wife and son filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on Omar’s behalf in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia.  When informed in February 2006 that Omar was to 
be referred to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI), they successfully sought a preliminary 
injunction from the district court barring his transfer.  The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia affirmed the district court’s jurisdiction over Omar’s petition and construed the 
injunction to prohibit transferring him to Iraqi custody, presenting him to the Iraqi Courts, or 
sharing details with the Iraqi Government concerning his possible release.5   
Mohammed Munaf is a citizen of both Iraq and the United States who returned to Iraq in 
March 2005 to serve as a translator for a group of Romanian journalists.6  Soon after their arrival 
in Iraq, the group was kidnapped.  When the group was released, American forces, again 
operating as part of MNF—I, took Munaf into custody, suspecting that he had been involved in 
the kidnapping.  Munaf was designated a “security internee,” and the MNF—I referred his case 
to the CCCI.  Based in part on a confession that he later recanted, the CCCI found him guilty of 
kidnapping and sentenced him to death.  On appeal, however, the Iraqi Court of Cassation 
vacated the conviction and remanded Munaf’s cases for further investigation, ordering that he 
“‘remain in custody pending the outcome’ of further criminal proceedings.”7 
                                                 
4 Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2214; Brief for the Habeas Petitioners at 3, Munaf v. Geren, Nos. 06–1666 
and 07–394 (Sup. Ct. June 12, 2008) at < 
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-394_PetitionerHabeas.pdf>. 
5 Id. at 2215.  
6 Id.  Munaf had originally settled in Romania.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 9-10. 
7 Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2215.   
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Prior to his trial, Munaf’s sister filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on his behalf 
in the District Court for the District of Columbia and sought a temporary restraining order to bar 
his transfer to Iraqi custody.  In October 2006, after Munaf’s conviction and sentence by the 
CCCI, the district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and rejected the 
request for a temporary restraining order as moot.  The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia affirmed the dismissal, distinguishing Munaf’s case from Omar’s (which the Court of 
Appeals had already decided) on the basis of Munaf’s actual conviction by a foreign tribunal.8 
Central to both Court of Appeals decisions was a key post-World War II precedent and 
the nature of the American forces operating in Iraq.  In Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 
(1948), the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with a petition for habeas corpus brought directly to 
the Court by Japanese citizens convicted and sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (“IMTFE”).  In a three paragraph per curiam opinion, the Court denied the petition, 
explaining that “[t]he petitioners, all residents and citizens of Japan, are being held in custody 
pursuant to the judgments of a military tribunal in Japan,” that the Court was “satisfied that the 
tribunal sentencing these petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States,” and that “[u]nder the 
foregoing circumstances, the courts of the United States have no power or authority to review, to 
affirm, set aside, or annul the judgments and sentences imposed on these petitioners.”9 
Opposing Omar’s and Munaf’s petitions, the U.S. Government (“the Government”) 
argued that as in Hirota, Omar and Munaf were being held not by the United States but by a 
multinational force and that Hirota thus precluded jurisdiction.10  American forces in Iraq 
                                                 
8 Id. at 2215-16. 
9 Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 197-198 (1948).   
10 Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2214-16. 
 
 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 102, No. 4 (forthcoming) 
4
operate as part of MNF—I, a coalition of 26 states, under a United Nations mandate and at the 
request of the Iraqi Government.  Along with fighting insurgents and training Iraqi security 
forces, MNF—I detains individuals accused of violating Iraqi law who are awaiting criminal 
proceedings and dispositions in Iraqi courts.  An American military unit under the command of 
American military officers administers such detentions, including those at Camp Cropper, where 
both Omar and Munaf have been held.11  The Government argued that this arrangement put 
Omar’s and Munaf’s petitions squarely within the circumstances of Hirota.     
In Omar v. Harvey, the Court of Appeals rejected this analogy, observing that Hirota’s 
holding was specifically confined to its circumstances.   Although noting that American 
citizenship differentiated Omar from the Hirota petitioners, the Court of Appeals focused on 
what it saw as the key difference—the fact that unlike the petitioners in Hirota, Omar had not yet 
been convicted by a foreign tribunal.  The Hirota “Court’s primary concern was that the petitions 
represented a collateral attack on the final judgment of an international tribunal,” and it was the 
Court’s lack of authority “to review, to affirm, set aside, or annul the judgments and sentences” 
of that tribunal that barred it from taking jurisdiction.12  Munaf’s petition was a different story.  
A second panel of the D.C. Circuit observed that Munaf had been convicted and sentenced by a 
foreign tribunal, the CCCI.  His case was thus distinguishable from Omar’s and controlled by the 
Hirota holding.  As a result the Appeals Court found jurisdiction over his habeas petition 
barred.13  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them.   
Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the Court, made quick work of the jurisdictional 
                                                 
11 Id. at 2213-14. 
12 Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
13 Munaf v. Geren, 482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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question, finding the precise language of the habeas statute and the Government’s concessions 
about the nature of U.S. military involvement in MNF—I dispositive in establishing jurisdiction.  
The habeas statute grants jurisdiction to the federal district courts to consider petitions brought 
by any person held “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States.”14  Key 
here, Chief Justice Roberts explained, is “[t]he disjunctive ‘or’,” which “makes clear that actual 
custody by the United States suffices for jurisdiction, even if that custody could be viewed as 
‘under ... color of’ another authority, such as the MNF—I.”15 
Based on the Government’s concessions, the Court found that Omar and Munaf were 
clearly within the “actual custody” of the United States.  As the Chief Justice recounted, “the 
United States acknowledges that Omar and Munaf are … held overseas in the immediate 
‘physical custody’ of American soldiers who answer only to an American chain of command,” 
and that “the MNF—I itself operates subject to a unified American command.”16  The 
Government has furthermore, “never argued that it lacks the authority to release Munaf or Omar, 
or that it requires the consent of other countries to do so.”17 
Nor did the Court see anything in Hirota that would suggest a different result or strip the 
courts of jurisdiction that the statute would otherwise provide.  The Government had argued that 
the Hirota petitioners had also been in “actual custody” of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur and 
the United States Eighth Army, but that the Court found the tribunal’s multinational status 
                                                 
14 Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2217 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(1)). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 2216. 
17 Id. 
 
 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 102, No. 4 (forthcoming) 
6
determinative in barring jurisdiction.18  Chief Justice Roberts observed, however, that these facts 
were contested in Hirota and were not among the circumstances relied on by the Court.  The per 
curiam opinion mentioned only that the IMTFE was a “foreign tribunal,” and “the Solicitor 
General expressly contended [in Hirota] that General MacArthur, as pertinent, was not subject to 
United States authority.”19  Hirota thus said little about situations such as Omar’s and Munaf’s 
where the Government had conceded practical authority over the two men. 
The Chief Justice noted, however, that even if the Government were correct in 
analogizing the international authority at issue in the two cases, the cases also differ with respect 
to Omar’s and Munaf’s status as American citizens.  The foreign citizenship of the petitioners 
was one of the “circumstances” noted by the Hirota court, and caselaw suggests that habeas 
jurisdiction might turn on the citizenship of the petitioner.20   
Jurisdiction over Omar’s and Munaf’s petitions, however, does not grant the courts 
authority to block Omar’s and Munaf’s transfer to Iraqi authorities.  Continuing on to consider 
the actual merits of the case,21 the Court found that where, as here, petitioners had voluntarily 
traveled to another sovereign state, were alleged to have committed serious crimes there, and 
                                                 
18 Id. at 2217. 
19 Id.  For more on the Hirota decision, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota:  Habeas 
Corpus, Citizenship, and Article III, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1499-1502, 1505-18 (2007). 
20 Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2218. 
21 Before moving on to the merits, the Court held that the district court in Omar had abused its 
discretion in granting a preliminary injunction without considering the likelihood of Omar’s 
success on the merits.  Id. at 2219.  As a result, had the Court not gone on to reach the merits, the 
rulings in both cases would have been vacated and remanded.  Id. 
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were being held in that state’s territory, it would be inappropriate for an American habeas court 
to interfere with their prosecution by that state.  Comity concerns, observed the Court, can 
require a court to abstain from exercising its habeas corpus power, and “Iraq has a sovereign 
right to prosecute Omar and Munaf for crimes committed on its soil.”22  Just as American courts 
will refuse to scrutinize a foreign judgment out of concern for “‘comity and respect for foreign 
sovereigns,’”23 so too should courts refrain from interfering with ongoing foreign prosecutions.  
In this case, this principle precludes courts not only from barring Omar’s and Munaf’s 
transfer, but also from granting their release.  As the Court explained, American forces are 
holding Omar and Munaf at the Iraqi government’s behest and pursuant to a U.N. mandate to 
contribute to Iraqi security.  American forces “function[], in essence, as [the Iraqi Government’s] 
jailor”; “MNF—I detention is an integral part of the Iraqi system of criminal justice.”24  Any 
order of release by an American court would thus interfere with Iraqi criminal proceedings.  
Moreover, explained the Court, this principle bars intervening even where citizens may 
be subjected to criminal process that falls short of the rights granted by the U.S. Constitution.  
“‘When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country he cannot complain if 
required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country.’”25 
“Habeas is not a means of compelling the United States to harbor fugitives from the criminal 
justice system of a sovereign with the undoubted authority to prosecute them.”26   
                                                 
22 Id. at 2221. 
23 Id. at 2224 (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F. 3d at 17 (Brown, J., dissenting in part)). 
24 Id. at 2223, 2224. 
25 Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2222 (quoting Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109, 23 (1901)). 
26 Id. at 2223. 
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Omar’s and Munaf’s fears of torture in Iraqi custody, although of “serious concern,” did 
not change the result.  Concerns about possible torture involve sensitive foreign policy issues, the 
Court explained, and are properly dealt with by the political branches.  Here, “the Solicitor 
General states that it is the policy of the United States not to transfer an individual in 
circumstances where torture is likely to result,” and “the State Department has determined that 
[Iraq’s] Justice Ministry—the department that would have authority over Munaf and Omar—as 
well as its prison and detention facilities have “‘generally met internationally accepted standards 
for basic prisoner needs.’”27  “[T]his is not a more extreme case in which the Executive has 
determined that a detainee is likely to be tortured but decides to transfer him anyway,”28 and the 
courts should not “second-guess” the judgments of the political branches.29   
Finding the issue insufficiently argued, the Court declined to consider more specific 
claims for relief under the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARR Act) 
and its prohibition on transfers where torture may result.30  Chief Justice Roberts noted in a 
footnote though that questions remain whether the FARR Act is applicable outside the 
immigration context and whether the Act’s prohibition on “returning” a detainee to a country 
would apply where the detainee is already in that country, albeit in U.S. custody.31  
Justice Souter added a concurrence, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.  Justice 
                                                 
27 Id. at 2226.  
28 Id. 
29 Id.   
30 Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2226.  The FARR Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998), 
implements provisions of the Convention Against Torture into American law.  
31 Id. at 2226 n.6. 
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Souter emphasized the importance of the case’s particular circumstances to the denial of relief.32  
Further, this decision did not foreclose relief where the Executive had determined that torture 
was likely nor where “the probability of torture is well-documented, even if the Executive fails to 
acknowledge it.”33  In those cases, Justice Souter observed, “it would be in order to ask whether 
substantive due process bars the Government from consigning its own people to torture.”34 
**** 
At first glance, the decision in Munaf seems quite narrow, a decision easily circumscribed 
to the unique facts of the case.  The Court discusses only the habeas statute (rather than the scope 
of Constitutional habeas corpus), and Chief Justice Roberts confines his finding of jurisdiction to 
situations involving American citizens held by forces answering exclusively to an American 
chain of command.  Notably, the Government’s concessions regarding the nature of MNF—I 
forces, their place within the chain of command, and their exclusive control over Munaf and 
Omar, seem central to the Court’s quick finding of jurisdiction.  Those concessions play a key 
role in distinguishing Hirota, and Chief Justice Roberts at least implies that Munaf might have 
been more difficult had those issues been contested here.  
The Court’s denial of relief is equally constrained by the facts.  The Court emphasizes 
that Munaf and Omar traveled voluntarily to Iraq, that they are accused of committing crimes in 
Iraq in violation of Iraqi law, and that both are awaiting Iraqi criminal process.35  The Court also 
emphasizes the unique mandate under which they are being held:  American forces are acting in 
                                                 
32 Id. at 2228 (Souter, J. concurring). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 20. 
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support of the Iraqi criminal justice system, are serving as Iraq’s de facto jailors, and are holding 
Munaf and Omar at the “behest of the Iraqi Government.”36  It narrowly construes the threat of 
torture, finding that “this is not a more extreme case in which the Executive has determined that 
a detainee is likely to be tortured but decides to transfer him,” and declines to consider potential 
FARR Act claims.  The Court even “express[es] no opinion on whether Munaf and Omar may be 
permitted to amend their respective pleadings to raise such a claim on demand.”37  
With such carefully circumscribed facts, Munaf may look much like the case it seeks to 
distinguish, Hirota—a case defined and confined by its unique circumstances.  Announced the 
same day as the Court’s blockbuster Boumediene decision,38 Munaf, like Hirota, might seem 
destined to be forgotten.  But at second glance, Munaf reveals a bevy of surprises, implications, 
and open-questions.  The Court’s decision is actually considerably broader than it might have 
been.  The Court could have differentiated Hirota and found jurisdiction based solely on Omar’s 
and Munaf’s American citizenship.  Instead, the Court relies mainly on the open-ended language 
of the habeas statute and the petitioners’ presence within the “actual custody” of the United 
States.  Citizenship is mentioned almost as an afterthought, another way to distinguish Hirota.   
The resulting jurisdictional test the Court adopts thus seems notably functionalist:  The 
courts have jurisdiction over a petitioner “when the United States official charged with his 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2226 n.6.  Still open following the decision is whether Hirota would 
preclude jurisdiction after a conviction by a “foreign tribunal.”  The Court sidestepped the issue 
after Munaf’s conviction was thrown out, but Omar and Munaf may in time be convicted.   
38 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). 
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detention has ‘the power to produce’ him.”39  Such a functional test for the habeas statute echoes 
Boumediene’s constitutional test of “plenary control” or “practical sovereignty.”40  It also 
suggests a wider range of situations in which habeas may be available.  Munaf does not 
foreclose, for example, statutory habeas jurisdiction over non-citizen detainees held by American 
forces at Bagram airbase in Afghanistan.  On the contrary, to the extent to which detainees there 
are not held at the behest of Afghanistan or on behalf of its criminal justice system, Munaf 
suggests that release may be an available remedy should their petitions be granted.  Munaf also 
seems to lower one hurdle to finding constitutional habeas jurisdiction over Bagram detainees.  
In Boumediene, the Court suggested that even where a facility was sufficiently within the plenary 
control of the United States, habeas might nonetheless be inappropriate “if the detention facility 
were located in an active theater of war.”41  The Court’s willingness to extend habeas to Camp 
Cropper in Iraq suggests a narrow view of “active theater of war” that might not include Bagram.    
The Court’s functional test also suggests the possible availability of habeas relief in some 
situations of “extraordinary rendition.”  In Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, a District of Columbia District 
Court found custody and thus habeas jurisdiction where the petitioner alleged that Saudi Arabian 
                                                 
39 Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2217 (quoting Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564, 574 (1885)).  This test 
may reflect concerns that the U.N. mandates and multinational coalitions under which American 
forces increasingly operate—in Iraq, the Balkans, or Afghanistan—could become legal fictions 
insulating all detentions abroad from judicial review.  Similar issues were raised regarding the 
United Kingdom’s involvement in MNF—I in R (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, 
[2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 2 WLR 31.   
40 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2252. 
41 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2262. 
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authorities were holding and interrogating him at the direction of U.S. officials and on behalf of 
the United States.42  Munaf ’s functional test for custody may open the door to similar petitions.43 
The breadth of the Court’s test for habeas jurisdiction is countered, however, by an 
equally broad denial of relief.  The Court’s decision to reach the merits of the petitions is the 
opinion’s most surprising element and seems calculated to temper the effects of its grant of 
jurisdiction in Boumediene as well as in Munaf.  Munaf’s clear bifurcation of jurisdiction and the 
availability of relief and its decision that, here, neither release nor barring transfer would be 
appropriate, underscores the point that finding habeas jurisdiction does not guarantee that relief 
will be available.  Detainees, whether at Guantanamo or in Iraq, may have access to American 
courts, but relief can be limited by the exigencies of national security and foreign affairs. 
The Court’s consideration of Omar’s and Munaf’s fears of torture may have the broadest 
implications.  The Court granted remarkable deference to the Executive in assessing the 
likelihood of torture in other states and in determining the proper response.44  The Court 
suggested that such decisions are best made by the political branches and left little room to 
                                                 
42 350 F.Supp.2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004).  The case was dismissed after he was transferred to the 
United States for trial.  Abu Ali v. Gonzales, 387 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2005); see also 
Vladeck, supra note 19, at 1532-34. 
43 Of course, the actual custody in Munaf was much more obvious, with Americans subject to the 
chain of command as immediate custodian.  Moreover, claims like Abu Ali’s may be seriously 
diminished by Munaf’s decision on the merits.  See infra note 44-48 and accompanying text. 
44 This deference is a stark contrast with the position of European Court of Human Rights, which 
recently reaffirmed its own obligation to review diplomatic assurances regarding torture.  See 
Saadi v. Italy, App. 37201/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), para. 148.  
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second guess those assessments.  Justice Souter’s concurrence does suggest some role for 
judicial review of executive decisions where “the probability of torture is well-documented,” but 
his apparent rejection of the evidence of torture in Iraq that was presented to the Court (which 
included the State Department’s own Iraq Country Report),45 suggest that this role is very 
limited.  With the possible exception of a case like Abu Ali,46 where the United States is alleged 
to be directing interrogations, it is thus hard to imagine much role for the courts in reviewing 
potential claims of extraordinary rendition.47  The Court does also leave open the possibility that 
Omar and Munaf may have FARR Act claims, but Chief Justice Robert’s footnote expresses 
considerable skepticism about the act’s applicability to their cases.  It also questions whether the 
act prevents transfer to states that might torture in any context other than immigration, an issue 
sure to be raised by Government efforts to return Guantanamo detainees to their home states.48   
Munaf may have been an easy case for the unanimous Court, but it seems to guarantee 
                                                 
45 See, e.g, Brief of Amici Curiae Non-Governmental Organizations at 6, Munaf v. Geren, Nos. 
06–1666 and 07–394 (Sup. Ct. June 12, 2008) at 
<http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-
394_OmarMunafAmCuNonGovtlOrgs.pdf>. 
46 350 F.Supp.2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004); see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
47 The implications of the Court’s deference to the Executive could even broader, bleeding over 
into other contexts, including extradition, see In re Extradition of Bilanovic, No. 1:08-MJ-74, 
2008 WL 5111846, at *12 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2008) (citing Munaf in support of rule of non-
inquiry), and removal, see Khouzam v. Attorney General of U.S., No. 07-2926, 08-1094, 2008 
WL 5101940, at *15 (3d Cir. Dec. 5, 2008) (discussing Munaf but rejecting its applicability).  
48 See, e.g., Belbacha v. Bush, 520 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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harder cases going forward.  The decision’s two halves point in opposite directions, suggesting 
both an emboldened Court, ready to review Executive actions and a modest Court, cautious in 
second-guessing national security decisions.  Munaf, much like Hirota, may remain a puzzle. 
HARLAN GRANT COHEN 
University of Georgia School of Law 
